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U.S. Strives for Flexibility in Accord on Japan

WASHINGTON—The flexibility of the proposed peace treaty for Japan and the proposed tripartite security treaty for the Pacific—the drafts of which the State Department made public on July 12—is something new for the United States in the postwar period of active participation in world affairs. Previous agreements and treaties signed by the American government since 1944 have been filled with specific instructions not easily capable of realization. Breaking with past experience, the drafters of the Japanese and Pacific treaties have addressed themselves simply to a few principles and have given the prospective signers of the treaties a limited set of obligations. This intentional vagueness will enable the interested powers to adapt themselves to new situations that arise in connection with the treaties, without having to violate some unworkable provision or to quarrel with another power about the meaning of some dogmatic clause which once seemed wise but has become impractical.

Treaty of Forgiveness

The peace treaty for Japan represents the principles of forgiveness as far as the enemy of World War II is concerned. It also leaves room for reconciliation between the United States and the Soviet Union. While it was drafted in expectation that the U.S.S.R. would not sign it and Soviet commentators have severely criticized it, the treaty nevertheless lists the Soviet Union among the states that are free to sign it.

Moreover, it provides that Japan “will be prepared to conclude” a similar treaty with any power which is at war with Japan, which adhered to the United Na-

tions Declaration of January 1, 1942, and which does not sign the present instrument. The Soviet Union is at war with Japan and adhered to the Declaration. The provision probably applies also to one of the two governments claiming to represent China, although the treaty does not mention either of them.

Japan, of course, pays a price for the war. In the treaty it formally accepts the

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decisions of the War Crimes court. It loses its empire, since it renounces, among other territories, claims to Korea and adjacent islands, Formosa, the Pescadores, southern Sakhalin and the islands formerly mandated to Japan which are now under United Nations trusteeship. Japan agrees to back the United States in recommending UN trusteeship for the Ryukyus, the Bonins, the Volcanos, Rosario Island, Parace Vela and Marcus Island. Japan is to give up special rights and interests in China dating back to 1901. The question of future control of Formosa, the Pescadores, southern Sakhalin, Spratly and the Paracel islands is left open.

The flexibility of the treaty is clear in provisions dealing with Japan's economic obligations to its former enemies. Noting that Japan “lacks the capacity . . . to make adequate reparation to the allied powers

and at the same time meet its other obligations,” the treaty nevertheless obliges Japan to negotiate agreements to help repair the damage done by Japanese forces in countries they occupied. The allies have the power to seize Japanese property rights and interests in allied countries. Japan is to transfer to the International Red Cross its assets in neutral countries as an indemnity to former prisoners of war and their families. None of these provisions rigidly sets an exact figure.

The key to forgiveness is in Chapter III, dealing with security affairs. Japan may arm itself as heavily as it sees fit, for “the Allied powers . . . recognize that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that Japan may enter voluntarily into collective security agreements.” The treaty calls for all occupation forces to get out of Japan within 90 days after the treaty comes into force; but Japan is free to make agreements with any one of the World War II Allied powers permitting it to station its troops in Japan. So American forces are expected to remain there. Japan cannot arm itself until it revises its constitution. The economic clauses also are generous. They give Japan reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment in economic relations with the signing powers. Japan is subject to no permanent disabilities or discriminations. Its sovereignty is to be as complete as that of the victors.

The treaty reaffirms basic American confidence in the United Nations. Not only does it oblige Japan to accept UN decisions about trusteeship over islands formerly administered and owned by Japan; but it states also, “Japan accepts the obligations

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set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations," particularly the obligations to settle international disputes by peaceful means, to refrain from threatening to use force in international relations and to assist the UN in carrying out actions undertaken in support of the Charter. Japan is to apply for UN membership, but under the usual admission procedure can join only if no permanent member of the UN Security Council votes against its entry.

Pacific Security Treaty

If all goes well, the treaty is to be signed on September 4 in San Francisco. The powers entitled to sign at that time are Australia, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, France, India, Indonesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Senate will have to approve the treaty before it becomes effective for the United States.

Despite the diplomatic triumph achieved by John Foster Dulles in persuading our non-Communist allies of World War II to accept the treaty with Japan, the fact remains that the United States is alone in reposing military and economic trust in the former enemy. Fear that Japan some time again might try to expand southward is still lively in the western and southern Pacific regions. The Philippine Republic takes some comfort from the presence of American troops in bases in the Philippines and the Ryukyus, but Australia and New Zealand have no such protection. To safeguard these two powers, the United States, incidental to the drafting of the Japanese treaty, has negotiated with them a "tripartite security treaty" of indefinite duration.

The United States, Australia, and New Zealand declare that "each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety" and

declares that it would "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." If their independence or security is threatened, they agree to consult. The treaty, however, creates no machinery for continuous consultation; instead it sets up a council, consisting of the foreign ministers or their deputies. The security treaty may allay the fears of Australia and New Zealand, but it is inadequate to secure the Pacific region by collective action. It leaves Indonesia, for example, exposed. The treaty has no provision for the addition of Indonesia's or any other state's signature. However, pending the development of "a more comprehensive system of regional security," the council is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with states in the Pacific area. The immediate effect, implicit in the Japanese and Pacific security treaties, is to give the United States responsibility for policing the Pacific.

BLAIR BOLLES

Korea Cease-Fire to Bring New Diplomatic Tests

The cease-fire negotiations begun on July 8 in the ancient Korean capital of Kaesong, three miles south of the 38th Parallel, were resumed on July 16 after a temporary break largely due, in the opinion of many observers, to lack of foresight on the part of the United States in making the initial arrangements. Communist propaganda took full advantage of the situation to picture the United Nations, and particularly the United States, as suppliants for peace and the start of the negotiations as a victory for the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists. The United Nations delegation at Kaesong, headed by Vice-Admiral Charles Turner Joy, commander of United States naval forces in the Far East, is composed of three other Americans and one South Korean, but includes no representatives of the other UN countries fighting in Korea. The Communist delegation, headed by General Nam Il of the North Korean army, is composed of two North Koreans and two Chinese.

Why Does East Want Cease-Fire?

In spite of these preliminary hurdles, the North Koreans and Chinese Communists have indicated a strong desire to negotiate a truce, agreeing, after some demurring, to accept the conditions laid down by General Matthew B. Ridgway concerning the neutralization of Kaesong and the admission of 20 newspaper reporters as part of the United States group.

United Nations officials see in the negotiations gratifying evidence of the efficacy of collective action against aggression—all the more so because the terms suggested on June 23 by Jacob A. Malik, Russian delegate to the UN, and subsequently elaborated in Moscow by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko in a conversation with American Ambassador Alan G. Kirk are closely modeled on the truce formula suggested on December 15 by the UN Group on a Cease-Fire composed of Nasrollah Entezam of Iran, president of the UN General Assembly, Sir Benegal N. Rau of India and Lester B. Pearson of Canada.

Why did the Russians—and Chinese—reject that UN formula as "a trap" in December, only to accept it in June? Two theories are held on this score in the UN. First, it is believed that last winter Moscow may still have expected a defeat of the UN forces without involvement on the part of Russia. When it became apparent that the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists would need considerable military aid from Russia to continue the struggle—thereby raising the spectre of World War III—the Kremlin, it is thought, decided the time had come to wind up the conflict.

The second theory in the UN is that it would have proved impossible for Russia, and still more for Communist China, to consider any truce proposals as long as General Douglas MacArthur remained in control of the UN forces. For General

MacArthur had made it clear that he was not only concerned with the task of checking aggression in Korea but also hoped to see the overthrow of Mao Tse-tung and the restoration of Chiang Kai-shek. The removal of General MacArthur, and even more important the Senate hearings which followed, demonstrated that the United States does not intend to intervene by force in China, and this, it is argued in the UN circles upholding the theory, opened the way to cease-fire negotiations.

After Cease-Fire, What?

Assuming that a cease-fire is concluded and arrangements are made for adequate supervision of both sides, will the UN rest on its laurels, or should it then press for a larger political settlement? While the success of the UN forces in driving the invaders back to the 38th Parallel is regarded by the sixteen UN nations involved in the Korean war as a distinct victory, it is realized that the UN, as well as the United States, had hoped to unify and rehabilitate Korea under international supervision. Should this hope be shelved for the time being? Should the UN Korean Reconstruction Agency concentrate on the rebuilding of South Korea? If so, how great a degree of political and economic stability can be expected in a divided country? If, however, the UN nations decide to seek unification, then will it not be necessary to hold a conference, either on Korea alone or on the problems of the Far

East in general? And can the United States hope to exclude Communist China and Russia from such a conference?

A cease-fire would also raise anew the thorny problems of the admission of Peiping to the UN and the future disposal of Formosa. Seventeen of the 60 UN members had recognized the Peiping regime before the Chinese Communists entered the war. These countries—among them Britain, the Scandinavian nations and India—forebore from pressing for Peiping's admission so long as Communist China was branded an aggressor. Once military operations have ceased, they may reopen the question.

The Washington Administration, meanwhile, pressed by its domestic critics, has taken an increasingly firmer stand toward Communist China. Government spokesmen have declared that this country would "never" permit the admission of Peiping to the UN, and that Formosa, to quote Secretary of State Dean Acheson's reply to a question by Senator Alexander Wiley, Republican of Wisconsin, "is now in the hands of the Chinese Nationalist Government, and will remain there." Should a majority of the UN members vote in the General Assembly to seat Peiping as the representative of China, the United States could bow to the will of the majority; or, as recently hinted by Mr. Acheson, it might ask the International Court of Justice whether the admission of a government (the admission of China as a nation is not involved, since China has been a

member of the UN from the outset) comes within the scope of the veto. Should Peiping be admitted, some UN members might urge a UN trusteeship over Formosa pending its final disposal, which would create another problem for United States decision.

The prospect of a Korean cease-fire raises issues even more far-reaching than Peiping's admission to the UN or the future status of Formosa. Leaving ideological considerations aside for the moment, Russia's major objective in Asia is to neutralize Japan, which since the end of the nineteenth century has been regarded as a threat to the security of Russia and China, not to speak of Korea; while its major objective in Europe is to neutralize Western Germany, whose rearmament spells for the Russians an armed attempt to recover the eastern provinces Germany lost at the end of World War II. The rearmament of Germany and Japan under the auspices of the United States and with American military and financial aid will not be contemplated with detachment by Moscow. It may therefore be expected that the Kremlin will deploy every effort to bring about a "cease-arms" in Germany and Japan, and the call for a cease-fire in Korea represents a step toward that end. Should the U.S.S.R., at this late hour, fail to modify the terms of the Japanese peace treaty, or to prevent a closer rapprochement of West Germany with the United States, it may fall back on a secondary line of policy—and that is the creation of a defensive no

man's land around its far-flung borders. Many signs point in that direction—the deportation to Russia of persons regarded as "unreliable" in Hungary and the threat of similar action in Rumania; the closing of all remaining loopholes through which information might leak out to the West, of which the trial in Prague of Associated Press correspondent William N. Oatis is only the latest dramatic example; and reports of efforts to create a national Catholic Church which would undertake to end the influence of the Vatican on Catholics in Eastern Europe.

A Korean cease-fire may portend delimitation of spheres of influence between East and West in all remaining twilight zones of the world, which by that token are zones of actual or potential strife. Should such delimitation ensue, there might be a period of intensive diplomatic activity in which each side would have the opportunity to use its wits in a global process of give-and-take. This does not mean the immediate emergence of greater confidence on the part of the East toward the West (or vice versa), ushering in an era of mutual understanding. But a Korean cease-fire may be the signal for a prolonged truce, during which the non-Communist nations will be challenged more than ever to show that they have the capacity not only to win military victories, but also victories over poverty and distress which remain the best allies of Russia and communism.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

Appeal to Masses New Trend in Latin America

After a period of comparative quiet, Latin American politics have begun to simmer again. While the controlled press in chorus voices plot-charges, President Juan D. Perón of Argentina is handling his opponents with a new roughness. In Bolivia, an army junta has invalidated an election. Little news seeps through the Colombian censorship, but there is enough to show dangerously high tension between a heavy-handed Conservative government and a harried Liberal opposition. In other countries, too, there are stirrings of unrest.

Argentina a Prototype

With Asia aflame and Europe on edge, the Western Hemisphere is the only relatively peaceful area of the world. Are these recent developments in Latin America only isolated, and therefore basically unimportant outbreaks, or do they foreshadow a significant trend?

On the surface there are few similarities among the patterns of events in Argentina, Bolivia and Colombia. Under the surface, there are common, and generally important factors. Argentina will serve as a prototype.

The key to what is happening in Argentina today is the presidential election for November 11, 1951—originally scheduled for February 1952. Perón has not committed himself to running again. "The time has not come," he cautions his followers when they clamor for a declaration; "it is premature to speak of my candidacy." But it is clear from obviously inspired efforts to persuade him that, barring some unforeseen development, he will be a candidate to succeed himself, perhaps with his wife, Evita, as his vice-presidential running mate.

Perón's present activities must be regarded, therefore, as incidents in a political campaign. Everything he says and does

is directed toward winning friends and votes for himself—or for his chosen successor, if for any reason he chooses not to run. This is what gives his policies significance. Perón is a shrewd politician. If he believes he can keep power by following certain lines of action, the chances are he is right. And if the Perón approach works in Argentina, it is likely that it would work in other Latin American countries.

The most striking thing about Perón's campaign is that it is directed toward the *descamisados* (shirtless ones)—the Argentine masses. This is a wide departure from the traditional Latin American pattern, in which the small economic "oligarchy," as Perón calls it, and the army are all that matter politically.

Wooing of Masses

From the very beginning of his rise to power Perón set out deliberately to change this by building up the workers as a

counterweight to the old ruling groups. The oligarchs were no great problem. Timid, uncertain, divided among themselves and politically inept, they were easy victims of a ruthless, driving dictator who knew just what he wanted.

The army is still a factor in Argentina. Many army officers heartily dislike the Peróns, particularly Evita, and a certain amount of plotting is probably going on. But even the army would hesitate to tackle the tough, organized mass of workers which Perón can, as he has demonstrated, mould and call out at will.

Perón's future depends, therefore, on keeping the support of the masses. He woos them constantly with bread and circuses: he furnishes the bread, Evita the circuses. And nothing upsets the Peróns so much as any sign of thanklessness such as the strike of the railroad workers last January. This was a strike against the government, which owns the railroads and, from Perón's point of view, was an act of the rankest ingratitude, for the railroad workers are among the best-treated in Argentina. The whole affair gave Perón the fright of his political life, and he smashed the strike with panicky harshness. While Argentina maintains its present high level of prosperity, there seems to be little danger of serious labor unrest. But fear of it must always haunt Perón, for the workers have become the most important factor in Argentine politics.

Perón's foreign policy is as much a function of his dependence on the masses as is his domestic policy. To hold the prosperity on which his regime rests, Perón must cooperate economically with other countries. This he shows himself quite willing to do. But to his followers at home he stresses the nationalism and isolationism which are as traditional in Argentina as, indeed, in much of Latin America.

He is anti-Communist, he claims and, as a matter of fact, he has pretty well eliminated communism as a serious factor in the country. But he is also opposed to capitalism, particularly the "capitalist imperialism" of the United States. He used both of his favorite and most effective vote-catching slogans during his expropriation of *La Prensa*. The paper was denounced as an organ of United States im-

perialism as well as an enemy of the workers.

This, then, is the general outline of the Perónista revolution which is still going on in Argentina. It is based not on old-fashioned political maneuvers or military force but on a direct appeal to the long-forgotten masses, which can only be effective in the form of higher living standards and better things for all. Where the masses cannot be given everything they want, it is convenient to distract them with na-

tionalist slogans and to blame the lack on someone else—preferably the United States and its alleged oligarchical allies at home.

Is this pattern being followed in other Latin American countries? If so, what does it mean for the future, and what attitude can the United States most wisely take under the circumstances?

HARRY B. MURKLAND

(The first of two articles. Mr. Murkland is Latin American editor of *Newsweek*.)

Joseph P. Chamberlain

On May 22, 1951, the Foreign Policy Association lost one of its staunchest friends: Joseph P. Chamberlain. He was one of the founders of the Association and for thirty-two years an active member of its Board of Directors; for part of that time he served as Chairman of the Board. Perhaps more than any other person he influenced through the years, by his wisdom, the course of the Association. His sympathetic interest encouraged the Foreign Policy Association in its projects for spreading information about world affairs to a broad cross-section of the American public.

In a world where notoriety is so often mistaken for fame it has been given to few men to live so modestly and unspectacularly such an active and useful life. He was never known to refuse a call for help in the sphere of politics, economics and sociology whether from his city, state or country. Over and over again he was called to various state capitols for assistance, and to Washington to advise in the State, Treasury and Labor Departments. He founded the Legislative Drafting Bureau in 1911, and was counsel for the Charter Commission of New York City.

In the humanitarian field he left his mark as chairman of the National Refugee Service and as a member of the High Commission for Refugees Coming from Germany, as a member of the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Aid of the Department of State, as chairman of the Advisory Committee of the United States Displaced Persons Commission and as chairman of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service.

Professor Chamberlain was best known for his knowledge of international adminis-

tration. He was professor of Public Law at Columbia University. He had degrees from countless universities, including Oxford, where in 1939-40 he was George Eastman Professor. In his busy life he still had time to contribute to many magazines articles on a great variety of subjects.

In the days when liberalism was so needed he was active in the American Association for Labor Legislation and, then and thereafter until his death, in Survey Associates. But, recognizing the need of a strong middle class as a bulwark against the extremes, he tended to become in his last days a liberal of today; that is, a wise conservative. Toward the end he strained his failing strength in his work for others. His many friends, in and out of the Foreign Policy Association, will miss his wise counsel and his warmth, kindness and generosity.

HERBERT L. MAY

(Mr. May, a member of the FPA Board of Directors for many years is President of the Permanent Central Opium Board of the United Nations.)

BOOKS ON LATIN AMERICA

Industry in Latin America, by George Wythe. New York, Columbia University Press, 1949. \$5.00.

The Economy of Latin America, by Wendell C. Gordon. New York, Columbia University Press, 1950. \$5.50.

Two important studies of the economy of Latin America utilize different approaches to the subject, both to good advantage. Dr. Wythe, in the second edition of his exhaustive study of industrialization south of the border, combines a presentation of facts and figures with an analysis of the sociological and political effects of economic expansion in each country. Professor Gordon, in discussing the Latin American economy in broad outline, analyzes it in terms of its different component factors—labor, agriculture, mining, manufacturing, capital formation, money and banking, prices and international trade.